Thanks to Matt for passing this along.
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Important picture from the piece:
Found via Simoleon Sense.
This week, the stock market sported a couple of halos.
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Related books:
The founder of a successful corporation steps down. Then what?
Now it is Apple Inc.'s turn, following Steve Jobs's resignation as CEO on Wednesday.
But history suggests it will not be a smooth ride.
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Steve Jobs' 2005 Stanford Commencement Address is always worth going back and watching from time to time.
My favorite quote from the speech:
"When I was 17 I read a quote that went something like "If you live each day as if it was your last, someday you'll most certainly be right." It made an impression on me, and since then, for the past 33 years, I have looked in the mirror every morning and asked myself, "If today were the last day of my life, would I want to do what I am about to do today?" And whenever the answer has been "no" for too many days in a row, I know I need to change something. Remembering that I'll be dead soon is the most important thing I've ever encountered to help me make the big choices in life, because almost everything--all external expectations, all pride, all fear of embarrassment or failure--these things just fall away in the face of death, leaving only what is truly important. Remembering that you are going to die is the best way I know to avoid the trap of thinking you have something to lose. You are already naked. There is no reason not to follow your heart."
Back in March, I posted a brief write-up on Lemarne, a company with a capital allocation philosophy familiar to value investors. For those still interested, they just released their results for the fiscal year-ended June 30th. The results were about as expected. Here are the key points:
HIGHLIGHTS
· Profit before tax totalled $5.15 million.
· Profit after tax totalled $3.72 million.
· Sales revenue totalled $54.8 million [up 13%]
· Shareholder funds $31.4 million at 30 June 2011 with cash on deposit totalling $19.8 million.
· Earnings per share 43.2 cents per share.
· Net tangible asset backing per share was $3.62
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Throughout the year, Lemarne has actively pursued a number of strategic opportunities with companies in Europe, USA and Australia. We will comment on Lemarne’s strategic opportunities and dividends at the Annual General Meeting.
The stock closed at (AUD) $3.45, which puts it trading at 0.95x tangible book value and about 8x earnings.
Disclosure: I am a portfolio manager at Chanticleer Advisors and the fund Chanticleer manages owns shares in Lemarne Corporation Limited. It may in the future buy or sell shares and it is under no obligation to update its activities. This is not a recommendation to buy or sell a security. Please do your own research before making an investment decision.
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Related link: Buffett's comments to CNBC
Thanks to Will for passing this along.
For-profit colleges are facing a tough test: getting new students to enroll.
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Related previous posts:
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Related papers:
“The Evolution of Cooperation”
Related books:
Evolution and the Theory of Games
Related Stanford course: Robert Sapolsky: Human Behavioral Biology – Spring 2010
From Probable Outcomes:
“The concept of fair value relates to the appropriate value for the stock market given existing economic and market conditions. For example, when the inflation rate is in the mid-range, then bond yields should be in the mid-range to compensate for that level of inflation. Likewise, since stocks are financial assets, the stock market’s valuation level should reflect the conditions of inflation. As a result, fair value is a relative concept, not an absolute one. Valuation is relative to the inflation rate; it is not a level that is arbitrarily anchored to a long-term average.”
And a graph from Crestmont’s site showing the relationship:
Alexander Roepers of Atlantic Investment Management is scheduled to present at the 7th Annual New York Value Investing Congress. In his February 2007 interview with Value Investor Insight, he described his investment philosophy:
I realized early on from watching people like Warren Buffett and some of the early private-equity players that if I was going to stand out, I needed to concentrate on my highest-conviction ideas, in a well-defined set of companies that I knew very well. As a result, I limit my universe inside and outside the U.S. in a variety of ways. I want liquidity, so I don’t look at anything below $1 billion in market cap. I want to have direct contact with management and to be a top-ten shareholder in my core holdings, so anything above a $20 billion market cap is out.
Because five or six unique holdings make up 60-70% of each of my portfolios, I also exclude companies with idiosyncratic risk profiles that I consider unacceptable in such a concentrated portfolio. That means I exclude high-tech and biotech companies with technological obsolescence risk, tobacco or pharmaceutical companies with big product-liability risks, utilities and other regulated companies where the government can change the rules of the game, and companies that lack sufficient transparency, like banks, brokerages and insurance companies.
Then we boil it down further into potential “core” longs and “other” longs. Core longs are those in which we can own 2-7% of the company and have a close, constructive relationship with management. Overall, the potential universe of core holdings has around 170 companies in the U.S. and about 180 outside the U.S. These are the stocks that drive our performance – we’ve made our record by finding our share of big winners among these core longs while avoiding almost any losers.
Readers of Value Investing World are eligible for a $1,700 discount to attend the New York Value Investing Congress on October 17 & 18. To qualify for the discount, please use the link below and the discount code N11VIW6. The discount expires on August 31, 2011. Disclosure: Value Investing World receives a referral fee for registrations generated through the link.
Click to register for the 7th Annual New York Value Investing Congress
This is a long excerpt from Howard Marks’ November 2001 Memo “You Can't Predict. You Can Prepare.” I think it is an important topic/mental model to keep in mind, both for today’s investing environment and for future ones. Especially since interest rates today are being kept artificially low, profit margins are still near all-time highs and Wall Street estimates for corporate earnings are based on, to quote John Hussman, the “assumption that profit margins will achieve and indefinitely sustain the highest profit margins observed in U.S. history.”
How can non-forecasters like Oaktree best cope with the ups and downs of the economic cycle? I think the answer lies in knowing where we are and leaning against the wind. For example, when the economy has fallen substantially, observers are depressed, capacity expansion has ceased and there begin to be signs of recovery, we are willing to invest in companies in cyclical industries. When growth is strong, capacity is being brought on stream to keep up with soaring demand and the market forgets these are cyclical companies whose peak earnings deserve trough valuations, we trim our holdings aggressively. We certainly might do so too early, but that beats the heck out of doing it too late.
The Credit Cycle
The longer I'm involved in investing, the more impressed I am by the power of the credit cycle. It takes only a small fluctuation in the economy to produce a large fluctuation in the availability of credit, with great impact on asset prices and back on the economy itself.
The process is simple:
- The economy moves into a period of prosperity.
- Providers of capital thrive, increasing their capital base.
- Because bad news is scarce, the risks entailed in lending and investing seem to have shrunk.
- Risk averseness disappears.
- Financial institutions move to expand their businesses – that is, to provide more capital.
- They compete for market share by lowering demanded returns (e.g., cutting interest rates), lowering credit standards, providing more capital for a given transaction, and easing covenants.
At the extreme, providers of capital finance borrowers and projects that aren't worthy of being financed. As The Economist said earlier this year, "the worst loans are made at the best of times." This leads to capital destruction – that is, to investment of capital in projects where the cost of capital exceeds the return on capital, and eventually to cases where there is no return of capital.
When this point is reached, the up-leg described above is reversed.
- Losses cause lenders to become discouraged and shy away.
- Risk averseness rises, and along with it, interest rates, credit restrictions and covenant requirements.
- Less capital is made available – and at the trough of the cycle, only to the most qualified of borrowers.
- Companies become starved for capital. Borrowers are unable to roll over their debts, leading to defaults and bankruptcies.
- This process contributes to and reinforces the economic contraction.
Of course, at the extreme the process is ready to be reversed again. Because the competition to make loans or investments is low, high returns can be demanded along with high creditworthiness. Contrarians who commit capital at this point have a shot at high returns, and those tempting potential returns begin to draw in capital. In this way, a recovery begins to be fueled.
I stated earlier that cycles are self-correcting. The credit cycle corrects itself through the processes described above, and it represents one of the factors driving the fluctuations of the economic cycle. Prosperity brings expanded lending, which leads to unwise lending, which produces large losses, which makes lenders stop lending, which ends prosperity, and on and on.
In "Genius Isn't Enough" on the subject of Long-Term Capital Management, I wrote "Look around the next time there's a crisis; you'll probably find a lender." Overpermissive providers of capital frequently aid and abet financial bubbles. There have been numerous recent examples where loose credit contributed to booms that were followed by famous collapses: real estate in 1989-92; emerging markets in 1994-98; Long-Term Capital in 1998; the movie exhibition industry in 1999-2000; venture capital funds and telecommunications companies in 2000-01. In each case, lenders and investors provided too much cheap money and the result was over-expansion and dramatic losses. In "Fields of Dreams" Kevin Costner was told, "if you build it, they will come." In the financial world, if you offer cheap money, they will borrow, buy and build – often without discipline, and with very negative consequences.
The credit cycle contributed tremendously to the tech bubble. Money from venture capital funds caused far too many companies to be created, often with little in terms of business justification or profit prospects. Wild demand for IPOs caused their hot stocks to rise meteorically, enabling venture funds to report triple-digit returns and attract still more capital requiring speedy deployment. The generosity of the capital markets let companies sign on for huge capital projects that were only partially financed, secure in the knowledge that more financing would be available later, at higher p/e's and lower interest rates as the projects were further along. This ease caused far more capacity to be built than was needed, a lot of which is sitting idle. Much of the investment that went into it may never be recovered. Once again, easy money has led to capital destruction.
In making investments, it has become my habit to worry less about the economic future – which I'm sure I can't know much about – than I do about the supply/demand picture relating to capital. Being positioned to make investments in an uncrowded arena conveys vast advantages. Participating in a field that everyone's throwing money at is a formula for disaster.
We have lived through a long period in which cash acted like ballast, retarding your progress. Now I think we're going into an environment where cash will be king. If you went to a leading venture capital fund in 1999 and said, "I'd like to invest $10 million with you," they'd say, "Lots of people want to give us their cash. What else can you offer? Do you have contacts? Strategic insights?" I think the answer today would be different.
One of the critical elements in business or investment success is staying power. I often speak of the six-foot-tall man who drowned crossing the stream that was five feet deep on average. Companies have to be able to get through the tough times, and cash is one of the things that can make the difference. Thus all of the investments we're making today assume we'll be going into the difficult part of the credit cycle, and we're looking for companies that will be able to stay the course.
The Corporate Life Cycle
As indicated above, business firms have to live through ups and downs. They're organic entities, and they have life cycles of their own.
Most companies are born in an entrepreneurial mode, starting with dreams, limited capital and the need to be frugal. `Success comes to some. They enjoy profitability, growth and expanded resources, but they also must cope with increasing bureaucracy and managerial challenges. The lucky few become world-class organizations, but eventually most are confronted with challenges relating to hubris; extreme size; the difficulty of controlling far-flung operations; and perhaps ossification and an unwillingness to innovate and take risks. Some stagnate in maturity, and some fail under aging products or excessive debt loads and move into distress and bankruptcy. The reason I say failure carries within itself the seeds of success is that bankruptcy then permits some of them to shed debt and onerous contracts and emerge with a reborn emphasis on frugality and profitability. And the cycle resumes . . . as ever.
The biggest mistakes I have witnessed in my investing career came when people ignored the limitations imposed by the corporate life cycle. In short, investors did assume trees could grow to the sky.
Thanks to Will for passing this along.
In short, software is eating the world.
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Related article: Software eats part of the world (read Andreessen article first)
A good article/write-up on Seeking Alpha of a company and manager with a great track record. The conference calls can be accessed HERE. (Neither I nor the fund I co-manage have a position in TTT at the time of this post)
It is perhaps not superfluous to add a word of caution. When we speak of the family likeness of mass movements, we use the word "family" in a taxonomical sense. The tomato and the nightshade are of the same family, the Solanaceae. Though the one is nutritious and the other poisonous, they have many morphological, anatomical and physiological traits in common so that even the non-botanist senses a family likeness. The assumption that mass movements have many traits in common does not imply that all movements are equally beneficent or poisonous. The book passes no judgments, and expresses no preferences. It merely tries to explain; and the explanations - all of them theories - are in the nature of suggestions and arguments even when they are stated in what seems a categorical tone. I can do no better than quote Montaigne: "All I say is by way of discourse, and nothing by way of advice. I should not speak so boldly if it were my due to be believed."